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To Explain or to Predict?
Galit Shmueli
Abstract. Statistical modeling is a powerful tool for developing and
testing theories by way of causal explanation, prediction, and descrip-
tion. In many disciplines there is near-exclusive use of statistical mod-
eling for causal explanation and the assumption that models with high
explanatory power are inherently of high predictive power. Conflation
between explanation and prediction is common, yet the distinction
must be understood for progressing scientific knowledge. While this
distinction has been recognized in the philosophy of science, the statis-
tical literature lacks a thorough discussion of the many differences that
arise in the process of modeling for an explanatory versus a predictive
goal. The purpose of this article is to clarify the distinction between
explanatory and predictive modeling, to discuss its sources, and to re-
veal the practical implications of the distinction to each step in the
modeling process.
Key words and phrases: Explanatory modeling, causality, predictive
modeling, predictive power, statistical strategy, data mining, scientific
research.
1. INTRODUCTION
Looking at how statistical models are used in dif-
ferent scientific disciplines for the purpose of the-
ory building and testing, one finds a range of per-
ceptions regarding the relationship between causal
explanation and empirical prediction. In many sci-
entific fields such as economics, psychology, educa-
tion, and environmental science, statistical models
are used almost exclusively for causal explanation,
and models that possess high explanatory power
are often assumed to inherently possess predictive
power. In fields such as natural language processing
and bioinformatics, the focus is on empirical predic-
tion with only a slight and indirect relation to causal
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explanation. And yet in other research fields, such
as epidemiology, the emphasis on causal explanation
versus empirical prediction is more mixed. Statisti-
cal modeling for description, where the purpose is
to capture the data structure parsimoniously, and
which is the most commonly developed within the
field of statistics, is not commonly used for theory
building and testing in other disciplines. Hence, in
this article I focus on the use of statistical mod-
eling for causal explanation and for prediction. My
main premise is that the two are often conflated, yet
the causal versus predictive distinction has a large
impact on each step of the statistical modeling pro-
cess and on its consequences. Although not explic-
itly stated in the statistics methodology literature,
applied statisticians instinctively sense that predict-
ing and explaining are different. This article aims to
fill a critical void: to tackle the distinction between
explanatory modeling and predictive modeling.
Clearing the current ambiguity between the two is
critical not only for proper statistical modeling, but
more importantly, for proper scientific usage. Both
explanation and prediction are necessary for gener-
ating and testing theories, yet each plays a differ-
ent role in doing so. The lack of a clear distinction
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within statistics has created a lack of understand-
ing in many disciplines of the difference between
building sound explanatory models versus creating
powerful predictive models, as well as confusing ex-
planatory power with predictive power. The impli-
cations of this omission and the lack of clear guide-
lines on how to model for explanatory versus pre-
dictive goals are considerable for both scientific re-
search and practice and have also contributed to the
gap between academia and practice.
I start by defining what I term explaining and
predicting. These definitions are chosen to reflect
the distinct scientific goals that they are aimed at:
causal explanation and empirical prediction, respec-
tively. Explanatory modeling and predictive model-
ing reflect the process of using data and statistical
(or data mining) methods for explaining or predict-
ing, respectively. The term modeling is intentionally
chosen over models to highlight the entire process in-
volved, from goal definition, study design, and data
collection to scientific use.
1.1 Explanatory Modeling
In many scientific fields, and especially the social
sciences, statistical methods are used nearly exclu-
sively for testing causal theory. Given a causal theo-
retical model, statistical models are applied to data
in order to test causal hypotheses. In such mod-
els, a set of underlying factors that are measured
by variables X are assumed to cause an underlying
effect, measured by variable Y . Based on collabora-
tive work with social scientists and economists, on
an examination of some of their literature, and on
conversations with a diverse group of researchers, I
conjecture that, whether statisticians like it or not,
the type of statistical models used for testing causal
hypotheses in the social sciences are almost always
association-based models applied to observational
data. Regression models are the most common ex-
ample. The justification for this practice is that the
theory itself provides the causality. In other words,
the role of the theory is very strong and the reliance
on data and statistical modeling are strictly through
the lens of the theoretical model. The theory–data
relationship varies in different fields. While the so-
cial sciences are very theory-heavy, in areas such as
bioinformatics and natural language processing the
emphasis on a causal theory is much weaker. Hence,
given this reality, I define explaining as causal ex-
planation and explanatory modeling as the use of
statistical models for testing causal explanations.
To illustrate how explanatory modeling is typi-
cally done, I describe the structure of a typical arti-
cle in a highly regarded journal in the field of Infor-
mation Systems (IS). Researchers in the field of IS
usually have training in economics and/or the be-
havioral sciences. The structure of articles reflects
the way empirical research is conducted in IS and
related fields.
The example used is an article by Gefen, Kara-
hanna and Straub (2003), which studies technology
acceptance. The article starts with a presentation of
the prevailing relevant theory(ies):
Online purchase intensions should be ex-
plained in part by the technology accep-
tance model (TAM). This theoretical model
is at present a preeminent theory of tech-
nology acceptance in IS.
The authors then proceed to state multiple causal
hypotheses (denoted H1,H2, . . . in Figure 1, right
panel), justifying the merits for each hypothesis and
grounding it in theory. The research hypotheses are
given in terms of theoretical constructs rather than
measurable variables. Unlike measurable variables,
Fig. 1. Causal diagram (left) and partial list of stated hypotheses (right) from Gefen, Karahanna and Straub (2003).
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constructs are abstractions that “describe a phe-
nomenon of theoretical interest” (Edwards and
Bagozzi, 2000) and can be observable or unobserv-
able. Examples of constructs in this article are trust,
perceived usefulness (PU), and perceived ease of use
(PEOU). Examples of constructs used in other fields
include anger, poverty, well-being, and odor. The hy-
potheses section will often include a causal diagram
illustrating the hypothesized causal relationship be-
tween the constructs (see Figure 1, left panel). The
next step is construct operationalization, where a
bridge is built between theoretical constructs and
observable measurements, using previous literature
and theoretical justification. Only after the theoret-
ical component is completed, and measurements are
justified and defined, do researchers proceed to the
next step where data and statistical modeling are in-
troduced alongside the statistical hypotheses, which
are operationalized from the research hypotheses.
Statistical inference will lead to “statistical conclu-
sions” in terms of effect sizes and statistical sig-
nificance in relation to the causal hypotheses. Fi-
nally, the statistical conclusions are converted into
research conclusions, often accompanied by policy
recommendations.
In summary, explanatory modeling refers here to
the application of statistical models to data for test-
ing causal hypotheses about theoretical constructs.
Whereas “proper” statistical methodology for test-
ing causality exists, such as designed experiments
or specialized causal inference methods for observa-
tional data [e.g., causal diagrams (Pearl, 1995), dis-
covery algorithms (Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines,
2000), probability trees (Shafer, 1996), and propen-
sity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rubin,
1997)], in practice association-based statistical mod-
els, applied to observational data, are most com-
monly used for that purpose.
1.2 Predictive Modeling
I define predictive modeling as the process of ap-
plying a statistical model or data mining algorithm
to data for the purpose of predicting new or future
observations. In particular, I focus on nonstochastic
prediction (Geisser, 1993, page 31), where the goal
is to predict the output value (Y ) for new observa-
tions given their input values (X). This definition
also includes temporal forecasting, where observa-
tions until time t (the input) are used to forecast
future values at time t+ k, k > 0 (the output). Pre-
dictions include point or interval predictions, pre-
diction regions, predictive distributions, or rankings
of new observations. Predictive model is any method
that produces predictions, regardless of its underly-
ing approach: Bayesian or frequentist, parametric or
nonparametric, data mining algorithm or statistical
model, etc.
1.3 Descriptive Modeling
Although not the focus of this article, a third
type of modeling, which is the most commonly used
and developed by statisticians, is descriptive mod-
eling. This type of modeling is aimed at summariz-
ing or representing the data structure in a compact
manner. Unlike explanatory modeling, in descriptive
modeling the reliance on an underlying causal the-
ory is absent or incorporated in a less formal way.
Also, the focus is at the measurable level rather than
at the construct level. Unlike predictive modeling,
descriptive modeling is not aimed at prediction. Fit-
ting a regression model can be descriptive if it is
used for capturing the association between the de-
pendent and independent variables rather than for
causal inference or for prediction. We mention this
type of modeling to avoid confusion with causal-
explanatory and predictive modeling, and also to
highlight the different approaches of statisticians and
nonstatisticians.
1.4 The Scientific Value of Predictive Modeling
Although explanatory modeling is commonly used
for theory building and testing, predictive modeling
is nearly absent in many scientific fields as a tool
for developing theory. One possible reason is the
statistical training of nonstatistician researchers. A
look at many introductory statistics textbooks re-
veals very little in the way of prediction. Another
reason is that prediction is often considered unsci-
entific. Berk (2008) wrote, “In the social sciences,
for example, one either did causal modeling econo-
metric style or largely gave up quantitative work.”
From conversations with colleagues in various disci-
plines it appears that predictive modeling is often
valued for its applied utility, yet is discarded for sci-
entific purposes such as theory building or testing.
Shmueli and Koppius (2010) illustrated the lack of
predictive modeling in the field of IS. Searching the
1072 papers published in the two top-rated journals
Information Systems Research and MIS Quarterly
between 1990 and 2006, they found only 52 empirical
papers with predictive claims, of which only seven
carried out proper predictive modeling or testing.
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Even among academic statisticians, there appears
to be a divide between those who value prediction as
the main purpose of statistical modeling and those
who see it as unacademic. Examples of statisticians
who emphasize predictive methodology include
Akaike (“The predictive point of view is a proto-
typical point of view to explain the basic activity of
statistical analysis” in Findley and Parzen, 1998),
Deming (“The only useful function of a statistician
is to make predictions” in Wallis, 1980), Geisser
(“The prediction of observables or potential observ-
ables is of much greater relevance than the estimate
of what are often artificial constructs-parameters,”
Geisser, 1975), Aitchison and Dunsmore (“predic-
tion analysis. . . is surely at the heart of many statis-
tical applications,” Aitchison and Dunsmore, 1975)
and Friedman (“One of the most common and im-
portant uses for data is prediction,” Friedman, 1997).
Examples of those who see it as unacademic are
Kendall and Stuart (“The Science of Statistics deals
with the properties of populations. In considering a
population of men we are not interested, statistically
speaking, in whether some particular individual has
brown eyes or is a forger, but rather in how many
of the individuals have brown eyes or are forgers,”
Kendall and Stuart, 1977) and more recently Parzen
(“The two goals in analyzing data. . . I prefer to
describe as “management” and “science.” Manage-
ment seeks profit. . . Science seeks truth,” Parzen,
2001). In economics there is a similar disagreement
regarding “whether prediction per se is a legitimate
objective of economic science, and also whether ob-
served data should be used only to shed light on ex-
isting theories or also for the purpose of hypothesis
seeking in order to develop new theories” (Feelders,
2002).
Before proceeding with the discrimination between
explanatory and predictive modeling, it is impor-
tant to establish prediction as a necessary scientific
endeavor beyond utility, for the purpose of devel-
oping and testing theories. Predictive modeling and
predictive testing serve several necessary scientific
functions:
1. Newly available large and rich datasets often con-
tain complex relationships and patterns that are
hard to hypothesize, especially given theories that
exclude newly measurable concepts. Using pre-
dictive modeling in such contexts can help un-
cover potential new causal mechanisms and lead
to the generation of new hypotheses. See, for ex-
ample, the discussion between Gurbaxani and
Mendelson (1990, 1994) and Collopy, Adya and
Armstrong (1994).
2. The development of new theory often goes hand
in hand with the development of new measures
(Van Maanen, Sorensen and Mitchell, 2007). Pre-
dictive modeling can be used to discover new
measures as well as to compare different oper-
ationalizations of constructs and different mea-
surement instruments.
3. By capturing underlying complex patterns and
relationships, predictive modeling can suggest im-
provements to existing explanatory models.
4. Scientific development requires empirically rig-
orous and relevant research. Predictive model-
ing enables assessing the distance between theory
and practice, thereby serving as a “reality check”
to the relevance of theories.1 While explanatory
power provides information about the strength
of an underlying causal relationship, it does not
imply its predictive power.
5. Predictive power assessment offers a straightfor-
ward way to compare competing theories by ex-
amining the predictive power of their respective
explanatory models.
6. Predictive modeling plays an important role in
quantifying the level of predictability of measur-
able phenomena by creating benchmarks of pre-
dictive accuracy (Ehrenberg and Bound, 1993).
Knowledge of un-predictability is a fundamen-
tal component of scientific knowledge (see, e.g.,
Taleb, 2007). Because predictive models tend to
have higher predictive accuracy than explanatory
statistical models, they can give an indication of
the potential level of predictability. A very low
predictability level can lead to the development
of new measures, new collected data, and new
empirical approaches. An explanatory model that
is close to the predictive benchmark may suggest
that our understanding of that phenomenon can
only be increased marginally. On the other hand,
an explanatory model that is very far from the
predictive benchmark would imply that there are
substantial practical and theoretical gains to be
had from further scientific development.
For a related, more detailed discussion of the value
of prediction to scientific theory development see the
work of Shmueli and Koppius (2010).
1Predictive models are advantageous in terms of negative
empiricism: a model either predicts accurately or it does not,
and this can be observed. In contrast, explanatory models can
never be confirmed and are harder to contradict.
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1.5 Explaining and Predicting Are Different
In the philosophy of science, it has long been de-
bated whether explaining and predicting are one or
distinct. The conflation of explanation and predic-
tion has its roots in philosophy of science literature,
particularly the influential hypothetico-deductive
model (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948), which ex-
plicitly equated prediction and explanation. How-
ever, as later became clear, the type of uncertainty
associated with explanation is of a different nature
than that associated with prediction (Helmer and
Rescher, 1959). This difference highlighted the need
for developing models geared specifically toward deal-
ing with predicting future events and trends such as
the Delphi method (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963). The
distinction between the two concepts has been fur-
ther elaborated (Forster and Sober, 1994; Forster,
2002; Sober, 2002; Hitchcock and Sober, 2004; Dowe,
Gardner and Oppy, 2007). In his book Theory Build-
ing, Dubin (1969, page 9) wrote:
Theories of social and human behavior ad-
dress themselves to two distinct goals of
science: (1) prediction and (2) understand-
ing. It will be argued that these are sep-
arate goals [. . . ] I will not, however, con-
clude that they are either inconsistent or
incompatible.
Herbert Simon distinguished between “basic science”
and “applied science” (Simon, 2001), a distinction
similar to explaining versus predicting. According
to Simon, basic science is aimed at knowing (“to de-
scribe the world”) and understanding (“to provide
explanations of these phenomena”). In contrast, in
applied science, “Laws connecting sets of variables
allow inferences or predictions to be made from known
values of some of the variables to unknown values of
other variables.”
Why should there be a difference between explain-
ing and predicting? The answer lies in the fact that
measurable data are not accurate representations
of their underlying constructs. The operationaliza-
tion of theories and constructs into statistical mod-
els and measurable data creates a disparity between
the ability to explain phenomena at the conceptual
level and the ability to generate predictions at the
measurable level.
To convey this disparity more formally, consider
a theory postulating that construct X causes con-
struct Y , via the function F , such that Y = F(X ).
F is often represented by a path model, a set of
qualitative statements, a plot (e.g., a supply and
demand plot), or mathematical formulas. Measur-
able variables X and Y are operationalizations of
X and Y , respectively. The operationalization of F
into a statistical model f , such as E(Y ) = f(X), is
done by considering F in light of the study design
(e.g., numerical or categorical Y ; hierarchical or flat
design; time series or cross-sectional; complete or
censored data) and practical considerations such as
standards in the discipline. Because F is usually not
sufficiently detailed to lead to a single f , often a set
of f models is considered. Feelders (2002) described
this process in the field of economics. In the predic-
tive context, we consider only X, Y and f .
The disparity arises because the goal in explana-
tory modeling is to match f and F as closely as
possible for the statistical inference to apply to the
theoretical hypotheses. The data X, Y are tools for
estimating f , which in turn is used for testing the
causal hypotheses. In contrast, in predictive mod-
eling the entities of interest are X and Y , and the
function f is used as a tool for generating good pre-
dictions of new Y values. In fact, we will see that
even if the underlying causal relationship is indeed
Y = F(X ), a function other than fˆ(X) and data
other than X might be preferable for prediction.
The disparity manifests itself in different ways.
Four major aspects are:
Causation–Association: In explanatory modeling f
represents an underlying causal function, and X
is assumed to cause Y . In predictive modeling f
captures the association between X and Y .
Theory–Data: In explanatory modeling, f is care-
fully constructed based on F in a fashion that
supports interpreting the estimated relationship
between X and Y and testing the causal hypothe-
ses. In predictive modeling, f is often constructed
from the data. Direct interpretability in terms of
the relationship between X and Y is not required,
although sometimes transparency of f is desirable.
Retrospective–Prospective: Predictive modeling is
forward-looking, in that f is constructed for pre-
dicting new observations. In contrast, explanatory
modeling is retrospective, in that f is used to test
an already existing set of hypotheses.
Bias–Variance: The expected prediction error for a
new observation with value x, using a quadratic
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loss function,2 is given by Hastie, Tibshirani and
Friedman (2009, page 223)
EPE = E{Y − fˆ(x)}2
= E{Y − f(x)}2 + {E(fˆ (x))− f(x)}2
(1)
+E{fˆ(x)−E(fˆ(x))}2
=Var(Y ) +Bias2 +Var(fˆ(x)).
Bias is the result of misspecifying the statistical
model f . Estimation variance (the third term) is
the result of using a sample to estimate f . The
first term is the error that results even if the model
is correctly specified and accurately estimated. The
above decomposition reveals a source of the differ-
ence between explanatory and predictive model-
ing: In explanatory modeling the focus is on mini-
mizing bias to obtain the most accurate represen-
tation of the underlying theory. In contrast, pre-
dictive modeling seeks to minimize the combina-
tion of bias and estimation variance, occasionally
sacrificing theoretical accuracy for improved em-
pirical precision. This point is illustrated in the
Appendix, showing that the “wrong” model can
sometimes predict better than the correct one.
The four aspects impact every step of the mod-
eling process, such that the resulting f is markedly
different in the explanatory and predictive contexts,
as will be shown in Section 2.
1.6 A Void in the Statistics Literature
The philosophical explaining/predicting debate has
not been directly translated into statistical language
in terms of the practical aspects of the entire statis-
tical modeling process.
A search of the statistics literature for discussion
of explaining versus predicting reveals a lively dis-
cussion in the context of model selection, and in par-
ticular, the derivation and evaluation of model selec-
tion criteria. In this context, Konishi and Kitagawa
(2007) wrote:
There may be no significant difference be-
tween the point of view of inferring the
true structure and that of making a pre-
diction if an infinitely large quantity of
2For a binary Y , various 0–1 loss functions have been sug-
gested in place of the quadratic loss function (Domingos,
2000).
data is available or if the data are noise-
less. However, in modeling based on a fi-
nite quantity of real data, there is a signifi-
cant gap between these two points of view,
because an optimal model for prediction
purposes may be different from one ob-
tained by estimating the ‘true model.’
The literature on this topic is vast, and we do not in-
tend to cover it here, although we discuss the major
points in Section 2.6.
The focus on prediction in the field of machine
learning and by statisticians such as Geisser, Aitchi-
son and Dunsmore, Breiman and Friedman, has high-
lighted aspects of predictive modeling that are rel-
evant to the explanatory/prediction distinction, al-
though they do not directly contrast explanatory
and predictive modeling.3 The prediction literature
raises the importance of evaluating predictive power
using holdout data, and the usefulness of algorith-
mic methods (Breiman, 2001b). The predictive fo-
cus has also led to the development of inference
tools that generate predictive distributions. Geisser
(1993) introduced “predictive inference” and devel-
oped it mainly in a Bayesian context. “Predictive
likelihood” (see Bjornstad, 1990) is a likelihood-based
approach to predictive inference, and Dawid’s pre-
quential theory (Dawid, 1984) investigates inference
concepts in terms of predictability. Finally, the bias–
variance aspect has been pivotal in data mining for
understanding the predictive performance of differ-
ent algorithms and for designing new ones.
Another area in statistics and econometrics that
focuses on prediction is time series. Methods have
been developed specifically for testing the predictabil-
ity of a series [e.g., random walk tests or the concept
of Granger causality (Granger, 1969)], and evalu-
ating predictability by examining performance on
holdout data. The time series literature in statis-
tics is dominated by extrapolation models such as
ARIMA-type models and exponential smoothing meth-
ods, which are suitable for prediction and descrip-
tion, but not for causal explanation. Causal models
for time series are common in econometrics (e.g.,
Song and Witt, 2000), where an underlying causal
theory links constructs, which lead to operational-
ized variables, as in the cross-sectional case. Yet, to
3Geisser distinguished between “[statistical] parameters”
and “observables” in terms of the objects of interest. His dis-
tinction is closely related, but somewhat different from our
distinction between theoretical constructs and measurements.
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the best of my knowledge, there is no discussion in
the statistics time series literature regarding the dis-
tinction between predictive and explanatory model-
ing, aside from the debate in economics regarding
the scientific value of prediction.
To conclude, the explanatory/predictive model-
ing distinction has been discussed directly in the
model selection context, but not in the larger con-
text. Areas that focus on developing predictive mod-
eling such as machine learning and statistical time
series, and “predictivists” such as Geisser, have con-
sidered prediction as a separate issue, and have not
discussed its principal and practical distinction from
causal explanation in terms of developing and test-
ing theory. The goal of this article is therefore to
examine the explanatory versus predictive debate
from a statistical perspective, considering how mod-
eling is used by nonstatistician scientists for theory
development.
The remainder of the article is organized as fol-
lows. In Section 2, I consider each step in the model-
ing process in terms of the four aspects of the predic-
tive/explanatory modeling distinction: causation–
association, theory–data, retrospective–prospective
and bias–variance. Section 3 illustrates some of these
differences via two examples. A discussion of the im-
plications of the predict/explain conflation, conclu-
sions, and recommendations are given in Section 4.
2. TWO MODELING PATHS
In the following I examine the process of statisti-
cal modeling through the explain/predict lens, from
goal definition to model use and reporting. For clar-
ity, I broke down the process into a generic set of
steps, as depicted in Figure 2. In each step I point
out differences in the choice of methods, criteria,
data, and information to consider when the goal is
predictive versus explanatory. I also briefly describe
the related statistics literature. The conceptual and
practical differences invariably lead to a difference
between a final explanatory model and a predic-
tive one, even though they may use the same initial
data. Thus, a priori determination of the main study
goal as either explanatory or predictive4 is essential
to conducting adequate modeling. The discussion in
this section assumes that the main research goal has
been determined as either explanatory or predictive.
4The main study goal can also be descriptive.
2.1 Study Design and Data Collection
Even at the early stages of study design and data
collection, issues of what and how much data to
collect, according to what design, and which col-
lection instrument to use are considered differently
for prediction versus explanation. Consider sample
size. In explanatory modeling, where the goal is to
estimate the theory-based f with adequate precision
and to use it for inference, statistical power is the
main consideration. Reducing bias also requires suf-
ficient data for model specification testing. Beyond
a certain amount of data, however, extra precision
is negligible for purposes of inference. In contrast,
in predictive modeling, f itself is often determined
from the data, thereby requiring a larger sample
for achieving lower bias and variance. In addition,
more data are needed for creating holdout datasets
(see Section 2.2). Finally, predicting new individ-
ual observations accurately, in a prospective man-
ner, requires more data than retrospective inference
regarding population-level parameters, due to the
extra uncertainty.
A second design issue is sampling scheme. For in-
stance, in the context of hierarchical data (e.g., sam-
pling students within schools) Afshartous and de
Leeuw (2005) noted, “Although there exists an ex-
tensive literature on estimation issues in multilevel
models, the same cannot be said with respect to pre-
diction.” Examining issues of sample size, sample al-
location, and multilevel modeling for the purpose of
“predicting a future observable y∗j in the Jth group
of a hierarchial dataset,” they found that allocation
for estimation versus prediction should be different:
“an increase in group size n is often more benefi-
cial with respect to prediction than an increase in
the number of groups J . . . [whereas] estimation is
more improved by increasing the number of groups
J instead of the group size n.” This relates directly
to the bias–variance aspect. A related issue is the
choice of f in relation to sampling scheme. Afshar-
tous and de Leeuw (2005) found that for their hierar-
chical data, a hierarchical f , which is more appropri-
ate theoretically, had poorer predictive performance
than a nonhierarchical f .
A third design consideration is the choice between
experimental and observational settings. Whereas
for causal explanation experimental data are greatly
preferred, subject to availability and resource con-
straints, in prediction sometimes observational data
are preferable to “overly clean” experimental data, if
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Fig. 2. Steps in the statistical modeling process.
they better represent the realistic context of predic-
tion in terms of the uncontrolled factors, the noise,
the measured response, etc. This difference arises
from the theory–data and prospective–retrospective
aspects. Similarly, when choosing between primary
data (data collected for the purpose of the study)
and secondary data (data collected for other pur-
poses), the classic criteria of data recency, relevance,
and accuracy (Patzer, 1995) are considered from
a different angle. For example, a predictive model
requires the secondary data to include the exact
X, Y variables to be used at the time of prediction,
whereas for causal explanation different operational-
izations of the constructs X ,Y may be acceptable.
In terms of the data collection instrument, whereas
in explanatory modeling the goal is to obtain a re-
liable and valid instrument such that the data ob-
tained represent the underlying construct adequately
(e.g., item response theory in psychometrics), for
predictive purposes it is more important to focus on
the measurement quality and its meaning in terms
of the variable to be predicted.
Finally, consider the field of design of experiments:
two major experimental designs are factorial designs
and response surface methodology (RSM) designs.
The former is focused on causal explanation in terms
of finding the factors that affect the response. The
latter is aimed at prediction—finding the combina-
tion of predictors that optimizes Y . Factorial designs
employ a linear f for interpretability, whereas RSM
designs use optimization techniques and estimate a
nonlinear f from the data, which is less interpretable
but more predictively accurate.5
2.2 Data Preparation
We consider two common data preparation opera-
tions: handling missing values and data partitioning.
2.2.1 Handling missing values Most real datasets
consist of missing values, thereby requiring one to
identify the missing values, to determine the extent
5I thank Douglas Montgomery for this insight.
and type of missingness, and to choose a course of
action accordingly. Although a rich literature ex-
ists on data imputation, it is monopolized by an
explanatory context. In predictive modeling, the so-
lution strongly depends on whether the missing val-
ues are in the training data and/or the data to be
predicted. For example, Sarle (1998) noted:
If you have only a small proportion of
cases with missing data, you can simply
throw out those cases for purposes of es-
timation; if you want to make predictions
for cases with missing inputs, you don’t
have the option of throwing those cases
out.
Sarle further listed imputation methods that are
useful for explanatory purposes but not for predic-
tive purposes and vice versa. One example is us-
ing regression models with dummy variables that
indicate missingness, which is considered unsatisfac-
tory in explanatory modeling, but can produce ex-
cellent predictions. The usefulness of creating miss-
ingness dummy variables was also shown by Ding
and Simonoff (2010). In particular, whereas the clas-
sic explanatory approach is based on the Missing-
At-Random, Missing-Completely-At-Random or Not-
Missing-At-Random classification (Little and Ru-
bin, 2002), Ding and Simonoff (2010) showed that
for predictive purposes the important distinction is
whether the missingness depends on Y or not. They
concluded:
In the context of classification trees, the
relationship between the missingness and
the dependent variable, rather than the
standard missingness classification approach
of Little and Rubin (2002). . . is the most
helpful criterion to distinguish different miss-
ing data methods.
Moreover, missingness can be a blessing in a pre-
dictive context, if it is sufficiently informative of Y
(e.g., missingness in financial statements when the
goal is to predict fraudulent reporting).
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Finally, a completely different approach for han-
dling missing data for prediction, mentioned by Sarle
(1998) and further developed by Saar-Tsechansky
and Provost (2007), considers the case where to-
be-predicted observations are missing some predic-
tor information, such that the missing information
can vary across different observations. The proposed
solution is to estimate multiple “reduced” models,
each excluding some predictors. When predicting an
observation with missingness on a certain set of pre-
dictors, the model that excludes those predictors is
used. This approach means that different reduced
models are created for different observations. Al-
though useful for prediction, it is clearly inappro-
priate for causal explanation.
2.2.2 Data partitioning A popular solution for
avoiding overoptimistic predictive accuracy is to
evaluate performance not on the training set, that
is, the data used to build the model, but rather on a
holdout sample which the model “did not see.” The
creation of a holdout sample can be achieved in var-
ious ways, the most commonly used being a random
partition of the sample into training and holdout
sets. A popular alternative, especially with scarce
data, is cross-validation. Other alternatives are re-
sampling methods, such as bootstrap, which can
be computationally intensive but avoid “bad par-
titions” and enable predictive modeling with small
datasets.
Data partitioning is aimed at minimizing the com-
bined bias and variance by sacrificing some bias in
return for a reduction in sampling variance. A smaller
sample is associated with higher bias when f is esti-
mated from the data, which is common in predictive
modeling but not in explanatory modeling. Hence,
data partitioning is useful for predictive modeling
but less so for explanatory modeling. With today’s
abundance of large datasets, where the bias sacrifice
is practically small, data partitioning has become a
standard preprocessing step in predictive modeling.
In explanatory modeling, data partitioning is less
common because of the reduction in statistical power.
When used, it is usually done for the retrospective
purpose of assessing the robustness of fˆ . A rarer
yet important use of data partitioning in explana-
tory modeling is for strengthening model validity,
by demonstrating some predictive power. Although
one would not expect an explanatory model to be
optimal in terms of predictive power, it should show
some degree of accuracy (see discussion in Section
4.2).
2.3 Exploratory Data Analysis
Exploratory data analysis (EDA) is a key initial
step in both explanatory and predictive modeling.
It consists of summarizing the data numerically and
graphically, reducing their dimension, and “prepar-
ing” for the more formal modeling step. Although
the same set of tools can be used in both cases,
they are used in a different fashion. In explanatory
modeling, exploration is channeled toward the the-
oretically specified causal relationships, whereas in
predictive modeling EDA is used in a more free-form
fashion, supporting the purpose of capturing rela-
tionships that are perhaps unknown or at least less
formally formulated.
One example is how data visualization is carried
out. Fayyad, Grinstein and Wierse (2002, page 22)
contrasted “exploratory visualization” with “confir-
matory visualization”:
Visualizations can be used to explore data,
to confirm a hypothesis, or to manipu-
late a viewer. . . In exploratory visualiza-
tion the user does not necessarily know
what he is looking for. This creates a dy-
namic scenario in which interaction is crit-
ical. . . In a confirmatory visualization, the
user has a hypothesis that needs to be
tested. This scenario is more stable and
predictable. System parameters are often
predetermined.
Hence, interactivity, which supports exploration
across a wide and sometimes unknown terrain, is
very useful for learning about measurement quality
and associations that are at the core of predictive
modeling, but much less so in explanatory model-
ing, where the data are visualized through the the-
oretical lens.
A second example is numerical summaries. In a
predictive context, one might explore a wide range
of numerical summaries for all variables of inter-
est, whereas in an explanatory model, the numerical
summaries would focus on the theoretical relation-
ships. For example, in order to assess the role of a
certain variable as a mediator, its correlation with
the response variable and with other covariates is
examined by generating specific correlation tables.
A third example is the use of EDA for assess-
ing assumptions of potential models (e.g., normality
or multicollinearity) and exploring possible variable
transformations. Here, too, an explanatory context
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would be more restrictive in terms of the space ex-
plored.
Finally, dimension reduction is viewed and used
differently. In predictive modeling, a reduction in the
number of predictors can help reduce sampling vari-
ance. Hence, methods such as principal components
analysis (PCA) or other data compression methods
that are even less interpretable (e.g., singular value
decomposition) are often carried out initially. They
may later lead to the use of compressed variables
(such as the first few components) as predictors,
even if those are not easily interpretable. PCA is
also used in explanatory modeling, but for a differ-
ent purpose. For questionnaire data, PCA and ex-
ploratory factor analysis are used to determine the
validity of the survey instrument. The resulting fac-
tors are expected to correspond to the underlying
constructs. In fact, the rotation step in factor anal-
ysis is specifically aimed at making the factors more
interpretable. Similarly, correlations are used for as-
sessing the reliability of the survey instrument.
2.4 Choice of Variables
The criteria for choosing variables differ markedly
in explanatory versus predictive contexts.
In explanatory modeling, where variables are seen
as operationalized constructs, variable choice is based
on the role of the construct in the theoretical causal
structure and on the operationalization itself. A broad
terminology related to different variable roles exists
in various fields: in the social sciences—antecedent,
consequent, mediator and moderator6 variables; in
pharmacology and medical sciences—treatment and
control variables; and in epidemiology—exposure and
confounding variables. Carte and Craig (2003) men-
tioned that explaining moderating effects has be-
come an important scientific endeavor in the field of
Management Information Systems. Another impor-
tant term common in economics is endogeneity or
“reverse causation,” which results in biased param-
eter estimates. Endogeneity can occur due to dif-
ferent reasons. One reason is incorrectly omitting
an input variable, say Z, from f when the causal
construct Z is assumed to cause X and Y . In a re-
gression model of Y on X , the omission of Z results
6“A moderator variable is one that influences the
strength of a relationship between two other vari-
ables, and a mediator variable is one that explains
the relationship between the two other variables” (from
http://psych.wisc.edu/henriques/mediator.html).
in X being correlated with the error term. Winkel-
mann (2008) gave the example of a hypothesis that
health insurance (X ) affects the demand for health
services Y . The operationalized variables are “health
insurance status” (X) and “number of doctor con-
sultations” (Y ). Omitting an input measurement
Z for “true health status” (Z) from the regression
model f causes endogeneity because X can be de-
termined by Y (i.e., reverse causation), which man-
ifests as X being correlated with the error term in
f . Endogeneity can arise due to other reasons such
as measurement error in X . Because of the focus
in explanatory modeling on causality and on bias,
there is a vast literature on detecting endogeneity
and on solutions such as constructing instrumen-
tal variables and using models such as two-stage-
least-squares (2SLS). Another related term is simul-
taneous causality, which gives rise to special mod-
els such as Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)
(Zellner, 1962). In terms of chronology, a causal ex-
planatory model can include only “control” vari-
ables that take place before the causal variable (Gel-
man et al., 2003). And finally, for reasons of model
identifiability (i.e., given the statistical model, each
causal effect can be identified), one is required to
include main effects in a model that contains an in-
teraction term between those effects. We note this
practice because it is not necessary or useful in the
predictive context, due to the acceptability of unin-
terpretable models and the potential reduction in
sampling variance when dropping predictors (see,
e.g., the Appendix).
In predictive modeling, the focus on association
rather than causation, the lack of F , and the prospec-
tive context, mean that there is no need to delve into
the exact role of each variable in terms of an under-
lying causal structure. Instead, criteria for choosing
predictors are quality of the association between the
predictors and the response, data quality, and avail-
ability of the predictors at the time of prediction,
known as ex-ante availability. In terms of ex-ante
availability, whereas chronological precedence of X
to Y is necessary in causal models, in predictive
models not only must X precede Y , but X must be
available at the time of prediction. For instance, ex-
plaining wine quality retrospectively would dictate
including barrel characteristics as a causal factor.
The inclusion of barrel characteristics in a predic-
tive model of future wine quality would be impossi-
ble if at the time of prediction the grapes are still
on the vine. See the eBay example in Section 3.2 for
another example.
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2.5 Choice of Methods
Considering the four aspects of causation–associa-
tion, theory–data, retrospective–prospective and bias–
variance leads to different choices of plausible meth-
ods, with a much larger array of methods useful
for prediction. Explanatory modeling requires inter-
pretable statistical models f that are easily linked to
the underlying theoretical model F . Hence the pop-
ularity of statistical models, and especially regression-
type methods, in many disciplines. Algorithmic meth-
ods such as neural networks or k-nearest-neighbors,
and uninterpretable nonparametric models, are con-
sidered ill-suited for explanatory modeling.
In predictive modeling, where the top priority is
generating accurate predictions of new observations
and f is often unknown, the range of plausible meth-
ods includes not only statistical models (interpretable
and uninterpretable) but also data mining algorithms.
A neural network algorithm might not shed light on
an underlying causal mechanism F or even on f ,
but it can capture complicated associations, thereby
leading to accurate predictions. Although model
transparency might be important in some cases, it is
of secondary importance: “Using complex predictors
may be unpleasant, but the soundest path is to go
for predictive accuracy first, then try to understand
why” (Breiman, 2001b).
Breiman (2001b) accused the statistical commu-
nity of ignoring algorithmic modeling:
There are two cultures in the use of statis-
tical modeling to reach conclusions from
data. One assumes that the data are gen-
erated by a given stochastic data model.
The other uses algorithmic models and
treats the data mechanism as unknown.
The statistical community has been com-
mitted to the almost exclusive use of data
models.
From the explanatory/predictive view, algorithmic
modeling is indeed very suitable for predictive (and
descriptive) modeling, but not for explanatory mod-
eling.
Some methods are not suitable for prediction
from the retrospective–prospective aspect, especially
in time series forecasting. Models with coincident
indicators, which are measured simultaneously, are
such a class. An example is the model Airfare t =
f(OilPricet), which might be useful for explaining
the effect of oil price on airfare based on a causal
theory, but not for predicting future airfare because
the oil price at the time of prediction is unknown.
For prediction, alternative models must be consid-
ered, such as using a lagged OilPrice variable, or cre-
ating a separate model for forecasting oil prices and
plugging its forecast into the airfare model. Another
example is the centered moving average, which re-
quires the availability of data during a time window
before and after a period of interest, and is therefore
not useful for prediction.
Lastly, the bias–variance aspect raises two classes
of methods that are very useful for prediction, but
not for explanation. The first is shrinkage methods
such as ridge regression, principal components re-
gression, and partial least squares regression, which
“shrink” predictor coefficients or even eliminate them,
thereby introducing bias into f , for the purpose of
reducing estimation variance. The second class of
methods, which “have been called the most influ-
ential development in Data Mining and Machine
Learning in the past decade” (Seni and Elder, 2010,
page vi), are ensemble methods such as bagging
(Breiman, 1996), random forests (Breiman, 2001a),
boosting7 (Schapire, 1999), variations of those meth-
ods, and Bayesian alternatives (e.g., Brown, Van-
nucci and Fearn, 2002). Ensembles combine multiple
models to produce more precise predictions by av-
eraging predictions from different models, and have
proven useful in numerous applications (see the Net-
flix Prize example in Section 3.1).
2.6 Validation, Model Evaluation and Model
Selection
Choosing the final model among a set of models,
validating it, and evaluating its performance, differ
markedly in explanatory and predictive modeling.
Although the process is iterative, I separate it into
three components for ease of exposition.
2.6.1 Validation In explanatory modeling, valida-
tion consists of two parts: model validation validates
that f adequately represents F , and model fit vali-
dates that fˆ fits the data {X,Y }. In contrast, vali-
dation in predictive modeling is focused on general-
ization, which is the ability of fˆ to predict new data
{Xnew, Ynew}.
7Although boosting algorithms were developed as ensem-
ble methods, “[they can] be seen as an interesting regulariza-
tion scheme for estimating a model” (Bohlmann and Hothorn,
2007).
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Methods used in explanatory modeling for model
validation include model specification tests such as
the popular Hausman specification test in econo-
metrics (Hausman, 1978), and construct validation
techniques such as reliability and validity measures
of survey questions and factor analysis. Inference
for individual coefficients is also used for detect-
ing over- or underspecification. Validating model fit
involves goodness-of-fit tests (e.g., normality tests)
and model diagnostics such as residual analysis. Al-
though indications of lack of fit might lead researchers
to modify f , modifications are made carefully in
light of the relationship with F and the constructs
X , Y .
In predictive modeling, the biggest danger to gen-
eralization is overfitting the training data. Hence
validation consists of evaluating the degree of over-
fitting, by comparing the performance of fˆ on the
training and holdout sets. If performance is signifi-
cantly better on the training set, overfitting is im-
plied.
Not only is the large context of validation markedly
different in explanatory and predictive modeling,
but so are the details. For example, checking for
multicollinearity is a standard operation in assess-
ing model fit. This practice is relevant in explana-
tory modeling, where multicollinearity can lead to
inflated standard errors, which interferes with infer-
ence. Therefore, a vast literature exists on strategies
for identifying and reducing multicollinearity, vari-
able selection being one strategy. In contrast, for
predictive purposes “multicollinearity is not quite as
damning” (Vaughan and Berry, 2005). Makridakis,
Wheelwright and Hyndman (1998, page 288) dis-
tinguished between the role of multicollinearity in
explaining versus its role in predicting:
Multicollinearity is not a problem unless
either (i) the individual regression coeffi-
cients are of interest, or (ii) attempts are
made to isolate the contribution of one
explanatory variable to Y, without the in-
fluence of the other explanatory variables.
Multicollinearity will not affect the ability
of the model to predict.
Another example is the detection of influential ob-
servations. While classic methods are aimed at de-
tecting observations that are influential in terms of
model estimation, Johnson and Geisser (1983) pro-
posed a method for detecting influential observa-
tions in terms of their effect on the predictive dis-
tribution.
2.6.2 Model evaluation Consider two performance
aspects of a model: explanatory power and predic-
tive power. The top priority in terms of model per-
formance in explanatory modeling is assessing ex-
planatory power, which measures the strength of re-
lationship indicated by fˆ . Researchers report R2-
type values and statistical significance of overall F -
type statistics to indicate the level of explanatory
power.
In contrast, in predictive modeling, the focus is on
predictive accuracy or predictive power, which refer
to the performance of fˆ on new data. Measures of
predictive power are typically out-of-sample metrics
or their in-sample approximations, which depend on
the type of required prediction. For example, predic-
tions of a binary Y could be binary classifications
(Yˆ = 0,1), predicted probabilities of a certain class
[Pˆ (Y = 1)], or rankings of those probabilities. The
latter are common in marketing and personnel psy-
chology. These three different types of predictions
would warrant different performance metrics. For
example, a model can perform poorly in producing
binary classifications but adequately in producing
rankings. Moreover, in the context of asymmetric
costs, where costs are heftier for some types of pre-
diction errors than others, alternative performance
metrics are used, such as the “average cost per pre-
dicted observation.”
A common misconception in various scientific fields
is that predictive power can be inferred from ex-
planatory power. However, the two are different and
should be assessed separately. While predictive power
can be assessed for both explanatory and predictive
models, explanatory power is not typically possible
to assess for predictive models because of the lack
of F and an underlying causal structure. Measures
such as R2 and F would indicate the level of asso-
ciation, but not causation.
Predictive power is assessed using metrics com-
puted from a holdout set or using cross-validation
(Stone, 1974; Geisser, 1975). Thus, a major differ-
ence between explanatory and predictive performance
metrics is the data from which they are computed. In
general, measures computed from the data to which
the model was fitted tend to be overoptimistic in
terms of predictive accuracy: “Testing the proce-
dure on the data that gave it birth is almost certain
to overestimate performance” (Mosteller and Tukey,
1977). Thus, the holdout set serves as a more real-
istic context for evaluating predictive power.
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2.6.3 Model selection Once a set of models f1, f2,
. . . has been estimated and validated, model selec-
tion pertains to choosing among them. Two main
differentiating aspects are the data–theory and bias–
variance considerations. In explanatory modeling,
the models are compared in terms of explanatory
power, and hence the popularity of nested models,
which are easily compared. Stepwise-type methods,
which use overall F statistics to include and/or ex-
clude variables, might appear suitable for achiev-
ing high explanatory power. However, optimizing
explanatory power in this fashion conceptually con-
tradicts the validation step, where variable inclu-
sion/exclusion and the structure of the statistical
model are carefully designed to represent the theo-
retical model. Hence, proper explanatory model se-
lection is performed in a constrained manner. In the
words of Jaccard (2001):
Trimming potentially theoretically mean-
ingful variables is not advisable unless one
is quite certain that the coefficient for the
variable is near zero, that the variable is
inconsequential, and that trimming will
not introduce misspecification error.
A researcher might choose to retain a causal co-
variate which has a strong theoretical justification
even if is statistically insignificant. For example, in
medical research, a covariate that denotes whether
a person smokes or not is often present in models
for health conditions, whether it is statistically sig-
nificant or not.8 In contrast to explanatory power,
statistical significance plays a minor or no role in
assessing predictive performance. In fact, it is some-
times the case that removing inputs with small coef-
ficients, even if they are statistically significant, re-
sults in improved prediction accuracy (Greenberg
and Parks, 1997; Wu, Harris and McAuley, 2007,
and see the Appendix). Stepwise-type algorithms
are very useful in predictive modeling as long as
the selection criteria rely on predictive power rather
than explanatory power.
As mentioned in Section 1.6, the statistics liter-
ature on model selection includes a rich discussion
on the difference between finding the “true” model
and finding the best predictive model, and on cri-
teria for explanatory model selection versus predic-
tive model selection. A popular predictive metric is
the in-sample Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
8I thank Ayala Cohen for this example.
Akaike derived the AIC from a predictive viewpoint,
where the model is not intended to accurately infer
the “true distribution,” but rather to predict future
data as accurately as possible (see, e.g., Berk, 2008;
Konishi and Kitagawa, 2007). Some researchers dis-
tinguish between AIC and the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) on this ground. Sober (2002) con-
cluded that AIC measures predictive accuracy while
BIC measures goodness of fit:
In a sense, the AIC and the BIC provide
estimates of different things; yet, they al-
most always are thought to be in compe-
tition. If the question of which estimator
is better is to make sense, we must decide
whether the average likelihood of a family
[=BIC] or its predictive accuracy [=AIC]
is what we want to estimate.
Similarly, Dowe, Gardner and Oppy (2007) con-
trasted the two Bayesian model selection criteria
Minimum Message Length (MML) and Minimum
Expected Kullback–Leibler Distance (MEKLD).
They concluded,
If you want to maximise predictive accu-
racy, you should minimise the expected
KL distance (MEKLD); if you want the
best inference, you should use MML.
Kadane and Lazar (2004) examined a variety of model
selection criteria from a Bayesian decision–theoretic
point of view, comparing prediction with explana-
tion goals.
Even when using predictive metrics, the fashion in
which they are used within a model selection process
can deteriorate their adequacy, yielding overopti-
mistic predictive performance. Berk (2008) described
the case where
statistical learning procedures are often
applied several times to the data with one
or more tuning parameters varied. The
AIC may be computed for each. But each
AIC is ignorant about the information ob-
tained from prior fitting attempts and how
many degrees of freedom were expended
in the process. Matters are even more com-
plicated if some of the variables are trans-
formed or recoded. . . Some unjustified op-
timism remains.
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2.7 Model Use and Reporting
Given all the differences that arise in the mod-
eling process, the resulting predictive model would
obviously be very different from a resulting explana-
tory model in terms of the data used ({X,Y }), the
estimated model fˆ , and explanatory power and pre-
dictive power. The use of fˆ would also greatly differ.
As illustrated in Section 1.1, explanatory models
in the context of scientific research are used to de-
rive “statistical conclusions” using inference, which
in turn are translated into scientific conclusions re-
garding F ,X,Y and the causal hypotheses. With
a focus on theory, causality, bias and retrospective
analysis, explanatory studies are aimed at testing or
comparing existing causal theories. Accordingly the
statistical section of explanatory scientific papers is
dominated by statistical inference.
In predictive modeling fˆ is used to generate pre-
dictions for new data. We note that generating pre-
dictions from fˆ can range in the level of difficulty,
depending on the complexity of fˆ and on the type
of prediction generated. For example, generating a
complete predictive distribution is easier using a
Bayesian approach than the predictive likelihood ap-
proach.
In practical applications, the predictions might be
the final goal. However, the focus here is on pre-
dictive modeling for supporting scientific research,
as was discussed in Section 1.2. Scientific predictive
studies and articles therefore emphasize data, asso-
ciation, bias–variance considerations, and prospec-
tive aspects of the study. Conclusions pertain to
theory-building aspects such as new hypothesis gen-
eration, practical relevance, and predictability level.
Whereas explanatory articles focus on theoretical
constructs and unobservable parameters and their
statistical section is dominated by inference, predic-
tive articles concentrate on the observable level, with
predictive power and its comparison across models
being the core.
3. TWO EXAMPLES
Two examples are used to broadly illustrate the
differences that arise in predictive and explanatory
studies. In the first I consider a predictive goal and
discuss what would be involved in “converting” it
to an explanatory study. In the second example I
consider an explanatory study and what would be
different in a predictive context. See the work of
Shmueli and Koppius (2010) for a detailed example
“converting” the explanatory study of Gefen, Kara-
hanna and Straub (2003) from Section 1 into a pre-
dictive one.
3.1 Netflix Prize
Netflix is the largest online DVD rental service
in the United States. In an effort to improve their
movie recommendation system, in 2006 Netflix an-
nounced a contest (http://netflixprize.com), mak-
ing public a huge dataset of user movie ratings. Each
observation consisted of a user ID, a movie title, and
the rating that the user gave this movie. The task
was to accurately predict the ratings of movie-user
pairs for a test set such that the predictive accu-
racy improved upon Netflix’s recommendation en-
gine by at least 10%. The grand prize was set at
$ 1,000,000. The 2009 winner was a composite of
three teams, one of them from the AT&T research
lab (see Bell, Koren and Volinsky, 2010). In their
2008 report, the AT&T team, who also won the 2007
and 2008 progress prizes, described their modeling
approach (Bell, Koren and Volinsky, 2008).
Let me point out several operations and choices
described by Bell, Koren and Volinsky (2008) that
highlight the distinctive predictive context. Start-
ing with sample size, the very large sample released
by Netflix was aimed at allowing the estimation of
f from the data, reflecting the absence of a strong
theory. In the data preparation step, with relation
to missingness that is predictively informative, the
team found that “the information on which movies
each user chose to rate, regardless of specific rat-
ing value” turned out to be useful. At the data ex-
ploration and reduction step, many teams including
the winners found that the noninterpretable Sin-
gular Value Decomposition (SVD) data reduction
method was key in producing accurate predictions:
“It seems that models based on matrix-factorization
were found to be most accurate.” As for choice of
variables, supplementing the Netflix data with infor-
mation about the movie (such as actors, director)
actually decreased accuracy: “We should mention
that not all data features were found to be useful.
For example, we tried to benefit from an extensive
set of attributes describing each of the movies in
the dataset. Those attributes certainly carry a sig-
nificant signal and can explain some of the user be-
havior. However, we concluded that they could not
help at all for improving the accuracy of well tuned
collaborative filtering models.” In terms of choice of
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methods, their solution was an ensemble of meth-
ods that included nearest-neighbor algorithms, re-
gression models, and shrinkage methods. In partic-
ular, they found that “using increasingly complex
models is only one way of improving accuracy. An
apparently easier way to achieve better accuracy is
by blending multiple simpler models.” And indeed,
more accurate predictions were achieved by collab-
orations between competing teams who combined
predictions from their individual models, such as the
winners’ combined team. All these choices and dis-
coveries are very relevant for prediction, but not for
causal explanation. Although the Netflix contest is
not aimed at scientific advancement, there is clearly
scientific value in the predictive models developed.
They tell us about the level of predictability of on-
line user ratings of movies, and the implicated use-
fulness of the rating scale employed by Netflix. The
research also highlights the importance of knowing
which movies a user does not rate. And importantly,
it sets the stage for explanatory research.
Let us consider a hypothetical goal of explain-
ing movie preferences. After stating causal hypothe-
ses, we would define constructs that link user be-
havior and movie features X to user preference Y ,
with a careful choice of F . An operationalization
step would link the constructs to measurable data,
and the role of each variable in the causality struc-
ture would be defined. Even if using the Netflix
dataset, supplemental covariates that capture movie
features and user characteristics would be absolutely
necessary. In other words, the data collected and
the variables included in the model would be differ-
ent from the predictive context. As to methods and
models, data compression methods such as SVD,
heuristic-based predictive algorithms which learn f
from the data, and the combination of multiple mod-
els would be considered inappropriate, as they lack
interpretability with respect to F and the hypothe-
ses. The choice of f would be restricted to statistical
models that can be used for inference, and would
directly model issues such as the dependence be-
tween records for the same customer and for the
same movie. Finally, the model would be validated
and evaluated in terms of its explanatory power, and
used to conclude about the strength of the causal re-
lationship between various user and movie charac-
teristics and movie preferences. Hence, the explana-
tory context leads to a completely different modeling
path and final result than the predictive context.
It is interesting to note that most competing teams
had a background in computer science rather than
statistics. Yet, the winning team combines the two
disciplines. Statisticians who see the uniqueness and
importance of predictive modeling alongside explana-
tory modeling have the capability of contributing to
scientific advancement as well as achieving meaning-
ful practical results (and large monetary awards).
3.2 Online Auction Research
The following example highlights the differences
between explanatory and predictive research in on-
line auctions. The predictive approach also illus-
trates the utility in creating new theory in an area
dominated by explanatory modeling.
Online auctions have become a major player in
providing electronic commerce services. eBay (www.
eBay.com), the largest consumer-to-consumer auc-
tion website, enables a global community of buy-
ers and sellers to easily interact and trade. Empir-
ical research of online auctions has grown dramat-
ically in recent years. Studies using publicly avail-
able bid data from websites such as eBay have found
many divergences of bidding behavior and auction
outcomes compared to ordinary offline auctions and
classical auction theory. For instance, according to
classical auction theory (e.g., Krishna, 2002), the
final price of an auction is determined by a priori
information about the number of bidders, their val-
uation, and the auction format. However, final price
determination in online auctions is quite different.
Online auctions differ from offline auctions in vari-
ous ways such as longer duration, anonymity of bid-
ders and sellers, and low barriers of entry. These and
other factors lead to new bidding behaviors that are
not explained by auction theory. Another important
difference is that the total number of bidders in most
online auctions is unknown until the auction closes.
Empirical research in online auctions has concen-
trated in the fields of economics, information sys-
tems and marketing. Explanatory modeling has been
employed to learn about different aspects of bidder
behavior in auctions. A survey of empirical explana-
tory research on auctions was given by Bajari and
Hortacsu (2004). A typical explanatory study relies
on game theory to construct F , which can be done
in different ways. One approach is to construct a
“structural model,” which is a mathematical model
linking the various constructs. The major construct
is “bidder valuation,” which is the amount a bidder
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is willing to pay, and is typically operationalized us-
ing his observed placed bids. The structural model
and operationalized constructs are then translated
into a regression-type model [see, e.g., Sections 5
and 6 in Bajari and Hortacsu (2003)]. To illustrate
the use of a statistical model in explanatory auc-
tion research, consider the study by Lucking-Reiley
et al. (2007) who used a dataset of 461 eBay coin
auctions to determine the factors affecting the final
auction price. They estimated a set of linear regres-
sion models where Y = log(Price) and X included
auction characteristics (the opening bid, the auc-
tion duration, and whether a secret reserve price
was used), seller characteristics (the number of pos-
itive and negative ratings), and a control variable
(book value of the coin). One of their four reported
models was of the form
log(Price) = β0 + β1 log(BookValue)
+ β2 log(MinBid) + β3Reserve
+ β4NumDays + β5PosRating
+ β6NegRating + ε.
The other three models, or “model specifications,”
included a modified set of predictors, with some in-
teraction terms and an alternate auction duration
measurement. The authors used a censored-Normal
regression for model estimation, because some auc-
tions did not receive any bids and therefore the price
was truncated at the minimum bid. Typical explana-
tory aspects of the modeling are:
Choice of variables: Several issues arise from the
causal-theoretical context. First is the exclusion
of the number of bidders (or bids) as a determi-
nant due to endogeneity considerations, where al-
though it is likely to affect the final price, “it is
endogenously determined by the bidders’ choices.”
To verify endogeneity the authors report fitting
a separate regression of Y = Number of bids on
all the determinants. Second, the authors discuss
operationalization challenges that might result in
bias due to omitted variables. In particular, the
authors discuss the construct of “auction attrac-
tiveness” (X ) and their inability to judge mea-
sures such as photos and verbal descriptions to
operationalize attractiveness.
Model validation: The four model specifications are
used for testing the robustness of the hypothesized
effect of the construct “auction length” across dif-
ferent operationalized variables such as the contin-
uous number of days and a categorical alternative.
Model evaluation: For each model, its in-sample R2
is used for determining explanatory power.
Model selection: The authors report the four fitted
regression models, including both significant and
insignificant coefficients. Retaining the insignifi-
cant covariates in the model is for matching f
with F .
Model use and reporting: The main focus is on in-
ference for the β’s, and the final conclusions are
given in causal terms. (“A seller’s feedback rat-
ings. . . have a measurable effect on her auction
prices. . . when a seller chooses to have her auction
last for a longer period of days [sic], this signifi-
cantly increases the auction price on average.”)
Although online auction research is dominated by
explanatory studies, there have been a few predic-
tive studies developing forecasting models for an
auction’s final price (e.g., Jank, Shmueli and Wang,
2008; Jap and Naik, 2008; Ghani and Simmons, 2004;
Wang, Jank and Shmueli, 2008; Zhang, Jank and
Shmueli, 2010). For a brief survey of online auc-
tion forecasting research see the work of Jank and
Shmueli (2010, Chapter 5). From my involvement in
several of these predictive studies, let me highlight
the purely predictive aspects that appear in this lit-
erature:
Choice of variables: If prediction takes place before
or at the start of the auction, then obviously the
total number of bids or bidders cannot be included
as a predictor. While this variable was also omit-
ted in the explanatory study, the omission was due
to a different reason, that is, endogeneity. How-
ever, if prediction takes place at time t during an
ongoing auction, then the number of bidders/bids
present at time t is available and useful for predict-
ing the final price. Even more useful is the time
series of the number of bidders from the start of
the auction until time t as well as the price curve
until time t (Bapna, Jank and Shmueli, 2008).
Choice of methods: Predictive studies in online auc-
tions tend to learn f from the data, using flexi-
ble models and algorithmic methods (e.g., CART,
k-nearest neighbors, neural networks, functional
methods and related nonparametric smoothing-
based methods, Kalman filters and boosting (see,
e.g., Chapter 5 in Jank and Shmueli, 2010). Many
of these are not interpretable, yet have proven to
provide high predictive accuracy.
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Model evaluation: Auction forecasting studies eval-
uate predictive power on holdout data. They re-
port performance in terms of out-of-sample met-
rics such as MAPE and RMSE, and are compared
against other predictive models and benchmarks.
Predictive models for auction price cannot provide
direct causal explanations. However, by producing
high-accuracy price predictions they shed light on
new potential variables that are related to price and
on the types of relationships that can be further
investigated in terms of causality. For instance, a
construct that is not directly measurable but that
some predictive models are apparently capturing is
competition between bidders.
4. IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND
SUGGESTIONS
4.1 The Cost of Indiscrimination to
Scientific Research
Currently, in many fields, statistical modeling is
used nearly exclusively for causal explanation. The
consequence of neglecting to include predictive mod-
eling and testing alongside explanatory modeling is
losing the ability to test the relevance of existing
theories and to discover new causal mechanisms.
Feelders (2002) commented on the field of economics:
“The pure hypothesis testing framework of economic
data analysis should be put aside to give more scope
to learning from the data. This closes the empirical
cycle from observation to theory to the testing of
theories on new data.” The current accelerated rate
of social, environmental, and technological changes
creates a burning need for new theories and for the
examination of old theories in light of the new real-
ities.
A common practice due to the indiscrimination
of explanation and prediction is to erroneously in-
fer predictive power from explanatory power, which
can lead to incorrect scientific and practical conclu-
sions. Colleagues from various fields confirmed this
fact, and a cursory search of their scientific litera-
ture brings up many examples. For instance, in ecol-
ogy an article intending to predict forest beetle as-
semblages infers predictive power from explanatory
power [“To study. . . predictive power, . . . we calcu-
lated the R2”; “We expect predictabilities with R2
of up to 0.6” (Muller and Brandl, 2009)]. In eco-
nomics, an article entitled “The predictive power
of zero intelligence in financial markets” (Farmer,
Patelli and Zovko, 2005) infers predictive power from
a high R2 value of a linear regression model. In epi-
demiology, many studies rely on in-sample hazard
ratios estimated from Cox regression models to infer
predictive power, reflecting an indiscrimination be-
tween description and prediction. For instance, Nabi
et al. (2010) used hazard ratio estimates and statis-
tical significance “to compare the predictive power
of depression for coronary heart disease with that of
cerebrovascular disease.” In information systems, an
article on “Understanding and predicting electronic
commerce adoption” (Pavlou and Fygenson, 2006)
incorrectly compared the predictive power of differ-
ent models using in-sample measures (“To examine
the predictive power of the proposed model, we com-
pare it to four models in terms of R2 adjusted”).
These examples are not singular, but rather they
reflect the common misunderstanding of predictive
power in these and other fields.
Finally, a consequence of omitting predictive mod-
eling from scientific research is also a gap between
research and practice. In an age where empirical re-
search has become feasible in many fields, the op-
portunity to bridge the gap between methodological
development and practical application can be easier
to achieve through the combination of explanatory
and predictive modeling.
Finance is an example where practice is concerned
with prediction whereas academic research is focused
on explaining. In particular, there has been a re-
liance on a limited number of models that are con-
sidered pillars of research, yet have proven to per-
form very poorly in practice. For instance, the CAPM
model and more recently the Fama–French model
are regression models that have been used for ex-
plaining market behavior for the purpose of portfolio
management, and have been evaluated in terms of
explanatory power (in-sample R2 and residual anal-
ysis) and not predictive accuracy.9 More recently,
researchers have begun recognizing the distinction
between in-sample explanatory power and out-of-
sample predictive power (Goyal and Welch, 2007),
which has led to a discussion of predictability magni-
tude and a search for predictively accurate explana-
tory variables (Campbell and Thompson, 2005). In
terms of predictive modeling, the Chief Actuary of
9Although in their paper Fama and French (1993) did split
the sample into two parts, they did so for purposes of testing
the sensitivity of model estimates rather than for assessing
predictive accuracy.
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the Financial Supervisory Authority of Sweden com-
mented in 1999: “there is a need for models with
predictive power for at least a very near future. . .
Given sufficient and relevant data this is an area for
statistical analysis, including cluster analysis and
various kind of structure-finding methods” (Palm-
gren, 1999). While there has been some predictive
modeling using genetic algorithms (Chen, 2002) and
neural networks (Chakraborty and Sharma, 2007),
it has been performed by practitioners and nonfi-
nance academic researchers and outside of the top
academic journals.
In summary, the omission of predictive modeling
for theory development results not only in academic
work becoming irrelevant to practice, but also in
creating a barrier to achieving significant scientific
progress, which is especially unfortunate as data be-
come easier to collect, store and access.
In the opposite direction, in fields that focus on
predictive modeling, the reason for omitting explana-
tory modeling must be sought. A scientific field is
usually defined by a cohesive body of theoretical
knowledge, which can be tested. Hence, some form
of testing, whether empirical or not, must be a com-
ponent of the field. In areas such as bioinformat-
ics, where there is little theory and an abundance
of data, predictive models are pivotal in generating
avenues for causal theory.
4.2 Explanatory and Predictive Power:
Two Dimensions
I have polarized explaining and predicting in this
article in an effort to highlight their fundamental
differences. However, rather than considering them
as extremes on some continuum, I consider them
as two dimensions.10,11 Explanatory power and pre-
dictive accuracy are different qualities; a model will
possess some level of each.
A related controversial question arises: must an
explanatory model have some level of predictive power
to be considered scientifically useful? And equally,
must a predictive model have sufficient explanatory
power to be scientifically useful? For instance, some
explanatory models that cannot be tested for pre-
dictive accuracy yet constitute scientific advances
are Darwinian evolution theory and string theory
10Similarly, descriptive models can be considered as a third
dimension, where yet different criteria are used for assessing
the strength of the descriptive model.
11I thank Bill Langford for the two-dimensional insight.
in physics. The latter produces currently untestable
predictions (Woit, 2006, pages x–xii). Conversely,
there exist predictive models that do not properly
“explain” yet are scientifically valuable. Galileo, in
his book Two New Sciences, proposed a demonstra-
tion to determine whether light was instantaneous.
According to Mackay and Oldford (2000), Descartes
gave the book a scathing review:
The substantive criticisms are generally
directed at Galileo’s not having identified
the causes of the phenomena he investi-
gated. For most scientists at this time,
and particularly for Descartes, that is the
whole point of science.
Similarly, consider predictive models that are based
on a wrong explanation yet scientifically and prac-
tically they are considered valuable. One well-known
example is Ptolemaic astronomy, which until recently
was used for nautical navigation but is based on a
theory proven to be wrong long ago. While such ex-
amples are extreme, in most cases models are likely
to possess some level of both explanatory and pre-
dictive power.
Considering predictive accuracy and explanatory
power as two axes on a two-dimensional plot would
place different models (f ), aimed either at expla-
nation or at prediction, on different areas of the
plot. The bi-dimensional approach implies that: (1)
In terms of modeling, the goal of a scientific study
must be specified a priori in order to optimize the
criterion of interest; and (2) In terms of model eval-
uation and scientific reporting, researchers should
report both the explanatory and predictive qualities
of their models. Even if prediction is not the goal,
the predictive qualities of a model should be re-
ported alongside its explanatory power so that it
can be fairly evaluated in terms of its capabilities
and compared to other models. Similarly, a predic-
tive model might not require causal explanation in
order to be scientifically useful; however, reporting
its relation to causal theory is important for pur-
poses of theory building. The availability of infor-
mation on a variety of predictive and explanatory
models along these two axes can shed light on both
predictive and causal aspects of scientific phenom-
ena. The statistical modeling process, as depicted
in Figure 2, should include “overall model perfor-
mance” in terms of both predictive and explanatory
qualities.
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4.3 The Cost of Indiscrimination to the
Field of Statistics
Dissolving the ambiguity surrounding explanatory
versus predictive modeling is important for advanc-
ing our field itself. Recognizing that statistical
methodology has focused mainly on inference indi-
cates an important gap to be filled. While our lit-
erature contains predictive methodology for model
selection and predictive inference, there is scarce sta-
tistical predictive methodology for other modeling
steps, such as study design, data collection, data
preparation and EDA, which present opportunities
for new research. Currently, the predictive void has
been taken up the field of machine learning and data
mining. In fact, the differences, and some would say
rivalry, between the fields of statistics and data min-
ing can be attributed to their different goals of ex-
plaining versus predicting even more than to factors
such as data size. While statistical theory has fo-
cused on model estimation, inference, and fit, ma-
chine learning and data mining have concentrated
on developing computationally efficient predictive
algorithms and tackling the bias–variance trade-off
in order to achieve high predictive accuracy.
Sharpening the distinction between explanatory
and predictive modeling can raise a new awareness
of the strengths and limitations of existing meth-
ods and practices, and might shed light on current
controversies within our field. One example is the
disagreement in survey methodology regarding the
use of sampling weights in the analysis of survey
data (Little, 2007). Whereas some researchers advo-
cate using weights to reduce bias at the expense of
increased variance, and others disagree, might not
the answer be related to the final goal?
Another ambiguity that can benefit from an ex-
planatory/predictive distinction is the definition of
parsimony. Some claim that predictive models should
be simpler than explanatory models: “Simplicity is
relevant because complex families often do a bad job
of predicting new data, though they can be made
to fit the old data quite well” (Sober, 2002). The
same argument was given by Hastie, Tibshirani and
Friedman (2009): “Typically the more complex we
make the model, the lower the bias but the higher
the variance.” In contrast, some predictive models
in practice are very complex,12 and indeed Breiman
12I thank Foster Provost from NYU for this observation.
(2001b) commented: “in some cases predictive mod-
els are more complex in order to capture small nu-
ances that improve predictive accuracy.” Zellner
(2001) used the term “sophisticatedly simple” to de-
fine the quality of a “good” model. I would suggest
that the definitions of parsimony and complexity are
task-dependent: predictive or explanatory. For ex-
ample, an “overly complicated” model in explana-
tory terms might prove “sophisticatedly simple” for
predictive purposes.
4.4 Closing Remarks and Suggestions
The consequences from the explanatory/predictive
distinction lead to two proposed actions:
1. It is our responsibility to be aware of how statisti-
cal models are used in research outside of statis-
tics, why they are used in that fashion, and in
response to develop methods that support sound
scientific research. Such knowledge can be gained
within our field by inviting scientists from differ-
ent disciplines to give talks at statistics confer-
ences and seminars, and to require graduate stu-
dents in statistics to read and present research
papers from other disciplines.
2. As a discipline, we must acknowledge the differ-
ence between explanatory, predictive and descrip-
tive modeling, and integrate it into statistics ed-
ucation of statisticians and nonstatisticians, as
early as possible but most importantly in “re-
search methods” courses. This requires creating
written materials that are easily accessible and
understandable by nonstatisticians. We should
advocate both explanatory and predictive mod-
eling, clarify their differences and distinctive sci-
entific and practical uses, and disseminate tools
and knowledge for implementing both. One par-
ticular aspect to consider is advocating a more
careful use of terms such as “predictors,” “pre-
dictions” and “predictive power,” to reduce the
effects of terminology on incorrect scientific con-
clusions.
Awareness of the distinction between explanatory
and predictive modeling, and of the different scien-
tific functions that each serve, is essential for the
progress of scientific knowledge.
APPENDIX: IS THE “TRUE” MODEL THE
BEST PREDICTIVE MODEL? A LINEAR
REGRESSION EXAMPLE
Consider F to be the true function relating con-
structs X and Y and let us assume that f is a valid
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operationalization of F . Choosing an intentionally
biased function f∗ in place of f is clearly undesir-
able from a theoretical–explanatory point of view.
However, we will show that f∗ can be preferable to
f from a predictive standpoint.
To illustrate this, consider the statistical model
f(x) = β1x1 + β2x2 + ε which is assumed to be cor-
rectly specified with respect to F . Using data, we
obtain the estimated model fˆ , which has the prop-
erties
Bias = 0,(2)
Var(fˆ(x)) = Var(x1βˆ1 + x2βˆ2)
(3)
= σ2x′(X ′X)−1x,
where x is the vector x= [x1, x2]
′, and X is the de-
sign matrix based on both predictors. Combining
the squared bias with the variance gives
EPE =E(Y − fˆ(x))2
= σ2 +0+ σ2x′(X ′X)−1x(4)
= σ2(1 + x′(X ′X)−1x).
In comparison, consider the estimated underspec-
ified form fˆ∗(x) = γˆ1x1. The bias and variance here
are given by Montgomery, Peck and Vining (2001,
pages 292–296):
Bias = x1γ1 − (x1β1 + x2β2)
= x1(x
′
1x1)
−1x′1(x1β1 + x2β2)
− (x1β1 + x2β2),
Var(fˆ∗(x)) = x1Var(γˆ1)x1 = σ
2x1(x
′
1x1)
−1x1.
Combining the squared bias with the variance gives
EPE = (x1(x
′
1x1)
−1x′1x2β2 − x2β2)
2
(5)
+ σ2(1 + x1(x
′
1x1)
−1x′1).
Although the bias of the underspecified model f∗(x)
is larger than that of f(x), its variance can be smaller,
and in some cases so small that the overall EPE will
be lower for the underspecified model. Wu, Harris
and McAuley (2007) showed the general result for an
underspecified linear regression model with multiple
predictors. In particular, they showed that the un-
derspecified model that leaves out q predictors has
a lower EPE when the following inequality holds:
qσ2 > β′2X
′
2(I −H1)X2β2.(6)
This means that the underspecified model produces
more accurate predictions, in terms of lower EPE,
in the following situations:
• when the data are very noisy (large σ);
• when the true absolute values of the left-out pa-
rameters (in our example β2) are small;
• when the predictors are highly correlated; and
• when the sample size is small or the range of left-
out variables is small.
The bottom line is nicely summarized by Hagerty
and Srinivasan (1991): “We note that the practice
in applied research of concluding that a model with
a higher predictive validity is “truer,” is not a valid
inference. This paper shows that a parsimonious but
less true model can have a higher predictive validity
than a truer but less parsimonious model.”
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